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The 2016 Election and the Future of
Constitutional Law: The Lessons of 1968
by EARL M. MALTZ*
Introduction
The recent death of Justice Antonin Scalia and the furor surrounding
President Obama's effort to have Judge Merrick B. Garland seated as
Scalia's replacement has served as a graphic reminder of the influence of
presidential politics on the evolution of constitutional doctrine. The
backdrop of the dispute over the Garland nomination is a series of
politically charged decisions in which the justices have been closely
divided along ideological lines. Thus, for example, during the 2014 term,
the progressive position was adopted by votes of 5-4 in cases dealing with
issues such as same-sex marriage' and the procedures for legislative
apportionment,2 while conservatives prevailed in disputes over capital
punishment3 and the rights of immigrants.4 In recent years, the same sharp
divisions have emerged in cases dealing with a variety of other significant
constitutional issues as well.
5
Against this background, if (as seems likely) Judge Garland is not
confirmed prior to the upcoming presidential election in November, the
outcome of that election will almost certainly have a profound impact on
the trajectory of the Court's decisions for years to come. Even if no other
justice leaves the Court in the next four years, a Democratic president
would almost certainly choose a replacement for Justice Scalia who would
join with Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia
Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan to create a majority that would consistently
support progressive positions. By contrast, a Republican president would
* Distinguished Professor, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden Campus.
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. State Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2562
(2015).
3. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
4. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2015).
5. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (constitutionality of
preclearance requirement of Voting Rights Act of 1965).
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be much more likely to select a justice who would join the conservative
bloc of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justices Clarence Thomas
and Samuel Alito, leaving Justice Anthony M. Kennedy as the swing vote
in most cases. Moreover, particularly given the fact that Justices Kennedy,
Breyer, and Ginsburg will each be over the age of eighty before the year
2020, the next president might very well have the opportunity to fill other
vacancies among the justices, thereby creating an opportunity to further
enhance the influence of either progressives or conservatives in cases
dealing with issues such as campaign finance regulations,6 abortion,7 and
race-based affirmative action.
8
Of course, the presidential election of 2016 will not be the first to have
had a profound impact on the course of constitutional development. In an
era in which formal constraints on judicial decision-making have lost much
of their significance and the choice of justices has become openly
politicized, such elections almost inevitably have an impact on the
evolution of constitutional doctrine. But, among recent presidential
contests, the election of 1968 stands out as a particularly significant
moment in American constitutional history.
In that election, Republican Richard M. Nixon, who had railed against
what he characterized as the progressive excesses of the Warren Court,
won a narrow victory over Hubert H. Humphrey, who, on domestic issues,
was known as a stalwart of the progressive wing of the Democratic Party.
Although Nixon served only slightly more than one full term before
resigning in disgrace, he had the opportunity to make four appointments to
the Court. These four justices played a crucial role in shaping
constitutional doctrines that continue to have significance almost fifty years
later.
This article will focus on the impact that the election of 1968 has had
on the evolution of constitutional law. The article will begin by discuss the
6. Conservative justices are often hostile to measures that limit contributions to political
campaigns. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917-925
(Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 925-29 (Scalia, J., concurring). By contrast, progressive often
vote to reject constitutional challenges to such regulations. See, e.g., id. at 929-79 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
7. While conservative justices often vote to reject constitutional challenges to state-
imposed limits on abortion, progressives are generally hostile to such regulations. Compare
Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132-68 (2007) (Kennedy, J.) (rejecting challenge to statute
prohibiting "partial birth" abortion) with id. at 169-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that
prohibition was unconstitutional).
8. While conservative justices are generally hostile to race-conscious affirmative action
programs, progressive justices almost uniformly find such programs to be constitutionally
unobjectionable. Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 708-48 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.) (striking down race-conscious admission program) with id. at
808-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that constitutional challenge should be rejected).
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election itself and Nixon's narrow victory over Humphrey. Using the
decisions involving the constitutional rights of the poor as an example, the
article will then describe the impact of the Nixon victory on the evolution
of constitutional doctrine. Finally, the article will discuss the lessons of the
experience of 1968 and its aftermath not only for the potential impact of the
upcoming presidential election, but also for our understanding of the nature
of constitutional law generally.
I. The Presidential Election of 19689
The contest for the presidency in 1968 featured not only Republican
Richard M. Nixon and Democrat Hubert H. Humphrey but also George C.
Wallace, the candidate of the American Independent Party, who was a
vocal supporter of racial segregation. Wallace had great strength in the
South and would ultimately carry five states in that region.10 Nonetheless,
from the beginning of the general election campaign, it was clear that either
Nixon or Humphrey would ultimately be chosen to be president. Although
both had had long experience on the national political stage, Nixon and
Humphrey brought very different perspectives to the campaign.
A. Richard Nixon
I
Richard Milhouse Nixon was born in Yorba Linda, California, on
January 9, 1913. He spent his early childhood on a family farm and then
moved to Whittier, California, where his father opened a gas station and
grocery store. After graduating from Whittier College in 1934 and Duke
Law School in 1937, Nixon practiced law in both Whittier and La Habra,
California. After the outbreak of World War II, Nixon moved to
Washington, D. C., where he worked at the Office of Price Administration
until entering the Navy in August, 1942. While in the military, Nixon rose
to the rank of lieutenant commander before resigning his commission in
1946. The same year, he was elected to Congress as a Republican, serving
two terms in the House of Representatives and gaining national recognition
as a staunch anti-Communist for his role in the investigation of Alger Hiss.
9. MICHAEL NELSON, RESILIENT AMERICA: ELECTING NIXON IN 1968, CHANNELING
DISSENT AND DIVIDING GOVERNMENT (University Press of Kansas 2014) (providing a detailed
account of the presidential election of 1968).
10. See John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Election of 1968, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=1968 (last visited July 31,
2015) [hereinafter Election of 1968].
11. Richard Nixon has been the subject of numerous biographies. See, e.g., HERBERT S.
PARMET, RICHARD M. NIXON: AN AMERICAN ENIGMA (Pearson 2008); CONRAD M. BLACK, THE
INVINCIBLE QUEST: THE LIFE OF RICHARD MILHOUS NIXON (McClelland & Stewart 2007).
Summer 20161
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Nixon continued his vociferous campaign against what he saw as the
Communist threat after being elected to the Senate from California in 1950.
In 1952, Nixon was elected to serve as Vice President under
Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower. Nixon served two terms in that
position before losing an extremely close contest to John F. Kennedy in the
presidential election of 1960. Two years later, he was the Republican
nominee in the race for governor of California, but once again was
defeated.
After his 1962 defeat, many believed that Nixon's political career was
over. However, he returned with a vengeance in 1968, fending off
challenges from both more liberal and more conservative opponents and
receiving the Republican nomination for President at the convention that
was held in Miami Beach, Florida in early August, 1968.12 At Nixon's
behest, the convention chose Maryland Governor Spiro T. Agnew of
Maryland as the Republican candidate for Vice-President.
In the general election campaign that followed, Nixon consistently
sought to portray himself as both a champion of law and order and a
defender of the traditional values that socially conservative Americans
perceived as being under assault from what was becoming known as the
"counter-culture." One of the most prominent targets of Nixon's attacks
was what he described as the "judicial activism" of the Warren Court,
particularly those decisions that expanded the rights of criminal
defendants.13 Simultaneously, while seeking to appeal to Southern whites
by criticizing the overzealous efforts of the Johnson administration to
integrate schools in the South through mandated transportation of students
away from their neighborhood schools, Nixon voiced approval of the




Hubert Horatio Humphrey was born in Wallace, South Dakota, on
May 27, 1911, the son of a pharmacist who was also an active participant
in local politics. Humphrey graduated from the University of Minnesota in
1937. After receiving his master's degree from Louisiana State University,
12. PBS.ORG, The Election of 1968, http://www.pbs.org/johngardner/chapters/5a.html (last
visited July 21, 2015).
13. See, e.g., Nixon Links Court to Rise in Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1968, at 18.
14. See, e.g., Muskie Considers Nixon Misleading, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1968, at 50.
15. Biographies of Hubert Humphrey include: CHARLES L. GARRETSON Ill, HUBERT H.
HUMPHREY: THE POLITICS OF JOY (Transaction Publishers 1993) and CARL SOLBERG, HUBERT
HUMPHREY: A BIOGRAPHY (W.W. Norton & Co. Inc. 1st ed. 1984).
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Humphrey returned to the University of Minnesota as an instructor and
doctoral student in 1943 before serving as a Professor of Political Science
at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota, from 1943 to 1944.
Humphrey quickly left academia to pursue a career in politics. In
1943, he made his first attempt to secure elective office, but was defeated
as the Democratic candidate for Mayor of Minneapolis. Soon thereafter,
Humphrey played a key role in effectuating the merger of the Democratic
and Farmer Labor parties in Minnesota. After being elected under the
Democratic Farmer Labor ("DFL") banner, he served as mayor of
Minneapolis from 1945 through 1948. In 1947, he also became one of the
founders of the Americans for Democratic Action, a progressive
anticommunist organization
Humphrey came to national prominence by virtue of his role in a
debate over the issue of civil rights at the Democratic National Convention
that was held in Philadelphia in 1948. At the convention, in an effort to
avoid antagonizing Southern Democrats, the platform committee drafted a
party platform that condemned racial discrimination only in the most
general terms.16 However, after a dramatic speech in which Humphrey
declared that the Democratic Party should "get out of the shadow of states'
rights and walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights,"'
' 7
party progressives succeeded in persuading a majority of the convention
delegates to abandon the committee plank in favor of much stronger
language that endorsed the specific recommendations of the 1946
Commission on Civil Rights that had been created by President Harry S.
Truman. In response, the delegates from the Southern states walked out of
the convention. 18
The same year that he made his convention speech, Humphrey was
elected to represent Minnesota in the United States Senate, where he would
serve for sixteen years. In the Senate, he established a reputation as one of
the leading proponents of civil rights and other progressive causes. While
serving as majority whip, he was one of the principal authors of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and played a major role in engineering the passage of
the statute.'9  After failing to secure the Democratic presidential
16. The Associated Press, Truman Sets Feb. / As 'Freedom Day,' N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
1948, at 1.
17. Hubert H. Humphrey: 1948 Democratic National Convention Address, AMERICAN
RHETORIC: TOP 100 SPEECHES, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/huberthumphrey
1948dnc.html (last visited July 21, 2015).
18. John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Democratic Party Platform of 1948, THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29599 (last visited
July 21, 2015).
19. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1978, at 1.
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nomination in 1960, Humphrey left the Senate in 1964 and was elected
Vice President on the Democratic ticket headed by Lyndon Baines
Johnson. Johnson subsequently won a landslide victory in the presidential
election.
At the beginning of 1968, most would have predicted that in the
election to be contested in November of that year, Humphrey would once
again be the vice presidential candidate of the Democratic party. But such
predictions did not adequately reckon with the impact of the deep divisions
in the party that had been engendered by the Vietnam War. After a strong
showing by antiwar candidate Eugene McCarthy in the New Hampshire
primary that was held on March 12, 1968, Robert F. Kennedy entered the
race for the Democratic presidential nomination. Against this backdrop, on
March 31, Johnson withdrew from the race. On April 27, Humphrey
announced that he too would seek the Democratic nomination. This
initially created an intense, three-way struggle in which Humphrey was
seen as the candidate of the party establishment, while McCarthy and
Kennedy vied for the support of Democratic insurgents. Events took an
even more shocking turn on June 5 when, shortly after midnight, Kennedy
was assassinated as he left a party celebrating his victory over McCarthy in
the California primary that had been held the day before.20
These events formed the backdrop for proceedings of the Democratic
National Convention that convened in Chicago, Illinois on August 26,
1968. The convention itself was a tumultuous affair marked by bitter
exchanges between members of competing factions within the hall and
violent clashes between police officers and antiwar demonstrators on the
streets of Chicago more generally. Against this background, on August 28
a majority of the delegates chose Humphrey to be the Democratic candidate
for President on the first ballot. The following day, Democratic Sen.
Edmond Muskie of Maine was selected as his running mate.2'
While eventually seeking to distance himself from the Johnson
administration on the issue of the Vietnam War, on domestic issues
Humphrey remained firmly committed to the defense of the actions taken
by the administration. Unlike Nixon, he unabashedly championed the
progressive social policies embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as well as the other elements of the Great
Society programs that had been enacted during Johnson's tenure in office.
22
20. PBS.ORG, supra note 12.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Max Frankel, Humphrey Terms Campaign A Poll on Human Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 1968, at 1.
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In short, on this point, the distinctions between Humphrey and Nixon could
hardly have been starker.
C. The Campaign
Initially, Nixon was the heavy favorite to prevail in the presidential
election over both Humphrey and Wallace. Polls taken soon after the
Democratic convention showed Humphrey trailing Nixon by a double-digit
23margin among likely voters. But as the election approached, Humphrey
began to close the gap. Thus, a poll published less than one week before
the election was to be held found the two leading candidates to be in a
virtual dead heat.
24
Ultimately, however, Nixon prevailed, receiving slightly more than
forty-three percent of the popular vote, while Humphrey received slightly
less than forty-three percent of the votes that were cast. More importantly,
the returns entitled Nixon to receive 301 votes in the Electoral College,
leaving Humphrey with only 191 and Wallace with 46. A shift of less than
300,000 votes out of the more than 73 million that were cast would have
been enough to provide Humphrey with a majority of the electoral votes.
25
However, the narrowness of Nixon's margin of victory made little
difference to the effect of his triumph on the evolution of constitutional
law.
II. The Nixon Appointees
The significance of Nixon's victory for the development of
constitutional doctrine can hardly be overestimated. During his first term
in office, Nixon was given the opportunity to dramatically reshape the
composition of the Supreme Court. In part, this opportunity arose from
what might be described as normal attrition. Thus, both John Marshall
Harlan and Hugo L. Black left the Court at the end of their lives in 1971.
But in addition, the extent of Nixon's influence on the trajectory of
constitutional law was enhanced by idiosyncratic events over which he had
no control.
Ironically, one of these events was triggered by the fear of an
impending victory by Nixon in the presidential election itself In an effort
to ensure that his successor as Chief Justice would be chosen by Lyndon
Johnson rather than Nixon, Earl Warren resigned his post on June 13, 1968,
with the proviso that the resignation would become effective only after a
23. WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1968, at A2.
24. WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1968, at Al.
25. Election of 1968, supra note 10.
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new Chief Justice was confirmed.26 However, this stratagem failed to
produce the desired result in substantial measure because Johnson chose
Associate Justice Abe Fortas to succeed Warren and Judge Homer
Thornberry of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to
fill the seat that would be vacated if Fortas were elevated.
Almost any identifiably progressive nominee would have faced
opposition from people dissatisfied with the orientation of Warren Court
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, in some important respects, Fortas proved to
be a uniquely vulnerable choice. First, as a sitting justice, he had a voting
record on cases involving issues such as criminal procedure and obscenity,
and this record presented easily identified specific targets on which the
opposition could focus. Second, some aspects of Fortas's nonjudicial
activities raised significant ethical concerns. Against this background,
Johnson and his supporters were unable to muster the support necessary to
break a filibuster against the nomination.27 The following year, in the face
of new allegations of ethical improprieties, Fortas was forced to leave the
Court entirely.
28
As a result of the resignations of Warren and Fortas, Nixon was given
the opportunity to fill a total of four seats on the Court during his first term
in office. Ultimately, these seats were filled by Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger and Justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H.
Rehnquist. As Kevin J. McMahon has demonstrated, Nixon did not make
any concerted effort to find the most conservative nominees available.
29
Thus, his selections were not uniformly hostile to all constitutional
arguments generally associated with progressive jurisprudenc e.
30
Nonetheless, because progressives were effectively excluded from
consideration, Nixon's choices ultimately played a crucial role in the
rejection of progressive arguments in a wide variety of cases. The
evolution of the law dealing with the rights of the poor provides a classic
26. Artemis Ward, An Extraconstitutional Arrangement: Lyndon Johnson and the Fall of
the Warren Court, 2 WHITE HOUSE STUDIES 97, 98 (Robert W. Watson ed., 2007).
27. John Massaro, LBJ and the Fortas Nomination for Chief Justice, 97 POL. SCI. Q. 603
(1982-83) (discussing the struggle over the Fortas nomination and the refusal of the Senate to
confirm him in detail).
28. The circumstances surrounding the Fortas resignation are described in LAURA
KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY (1990) and BRUCE MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND
RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (1988).
29. KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON'S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM
AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (2011).
30. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring
in the result) (enhanced scrutiny for sex discrimination); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Powell support strict scrutiny for restrictions on
access to abortion).
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example of the impact of the Nixon justices on the development of
constitutional law.
11. The Nixon Appointees and the Rights of the Poor
A. The Rights of the Poor in Warren Court Jurisprudence
During the Warren era, the Court handed down a number of decisions
which seemed to suggest that wealth-based classifications should be
considered suspect under the two-tiered approach to equal protection
analysis.31 The first indications that the Court might be moving toward the
view that the Equal Protection Clause should be interpreted to require
enhanced scrutiny of classifications based on wealth came in the 1963
decision in Douglas v. California.32  In concluding that the state of
California was constitutionally required to provide indigent criminal
defendants with appointed counsel in appeals as of right, Justice William
0. Douglas declared that:
[T]here is lacking that equality demanded by the
Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals
as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into
the record, research of the law, and marshaling of
arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already
burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is
without merit, is forced to shift for himself.
33
In 1966, speaking for the majority in Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections,34 Douglas focused on discrimination between rich and poor in a
quite different context. Harper was a challenge to a state requirement that
citizens pay a poll tax in order to be eligible to vote. In holding that this
requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause, Douglas declared that
"wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to
participate intelligently in the electoral process"' 35 and that "lines drawn on
the basis of wealth or property, like those of race are traditionally
31. The basic structure of two-tiered equal protection analysis is described in Gerald
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
32. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
33. Id. at 357-58.
34. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
35. Id. at 668.
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disfavored.,36  Three years later, speaking for a unanimous Court in
McDonald v. State Board of Election Commissioners,37 Chief Justice
Warren declared in dictum that discrimination based on wealth was a factor
"which... independently render[s] a classification highly suspect and
thereby demand[s] a more exacting judicial scrutiny.
' 38
Progressives enthusiastically embraced these decisions and
optimistically looked to a future in which they hoped that the Court would
invoke the Constitution to provide even greater protection for the interests
of the least wealthy Americans.39 However, even before the decision in
McDonald was handed down, the presidential election of 1968 set in
motion a series of events that would ultimately prove these hopes to be
unfounded.
B. The Nixon Appointees and the Rights of the Poor
Even after the arrival of Warren Burger and Harry Blackmun, the
Court initially continued to expand the scope of constitutional protections
for the rights of indigents. The 1971 decision in Boddie v. Connecticut4 °
was the first case in which the Court invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to
invalidate the requirement that a fee be paid to initiate a civil action.
Boddie was a challenge to a Connecticut statute that required a person
seeking a divorce to pay a fee that averaged fifty dollars in order to have
his petition adjudicated. With only Justice Black dissenting, the Boddie
Court held that the state of Connecticut could not constitutionally require
an indigent who was seeking a divorce to pay the fee. But while Justices
Douglas and Brennan would have relied on the same equal protection
analysis that had animated Douglas and Harper,41 Justice Harlan's majority
opinion relied instead on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In concluding that the Connecticut fee requirement ran afoul of the
Due Process Clause, Harlan-who had dissented in both Douglas and
Harper-explicitly declined to express any view on the question of
whether the Constitution protected the right to pursue civil actions
36. Id. (citations omitted).
37. McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs of Chi., 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
38. Id. at 807.
39. See Frank 1. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) for the classic exposition of the progressive view on
these issues.
40. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
41. Id. at 383-86 (Douglas, J., concurring in the result); 386-89 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part).
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generally. Instead, he focused on two specific characteristics of divorce
proceedings. First, he noted that divorce involved "the adjustment of [the]
fundamental human relationship [of marriage],42 which the Court had
consistently characterized as an interest "of basic importance in our
society.' '43 In addition, the majority opinion repeatedly emphasized the fact
that the parties were powerless to adjust their marital status without judicial
intervention. Against this background, Harlan concluded that the state
"[could not] pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal relationship without
affording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so.
44
The carefully worded opinion in Boddie left the status of other
constitutional challenges to laws that required the payment of fees
uncertain. This uncertainty was resolved in 1973 when the contention that
discrimination on the basis of wealth should generally be subject to strict
scrutiny was decisively rejected in United States v. Kras.45 Kras was a
constitutional challenge to a requirement that those seeking a discharge of
their debts in bankruptcy pay a fee in order to have their petitions
considered by the federal judiciary. Relying heavily on Boddie, an indigent
petitioner who claimed that he was unable to pay the fee raised both due
process and equal protection challenges to the requirement. However,
Byron White joined the four Nixon appointees to form a majority that
found these claims to be without merit.
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Kras cited a variety of factors
in concluding that the constitutional challenge was without merit. Not
surprisingly, much of the opinion focused specifically on the problem of
distinguishing Kras from Boddie. After noting that in the Boddie opinion
itself Justice Harlan had specifically noted that his analysis was designed to
go .'no further than necessary to dispose of the case before us,
' 46
Blackmun emphasized the fact that the Court subsequently had declined to
review lower court decisions that had rejected constitutional challenges to
the very fees that were at issue in Kras.47 While conceding that "a denial of
certiorari normally carries no implication or inference,48 Blackmun noted
that the denial of certiorari in the cases that he cited had drawn dissents
from Justices Black and Douglas, and argued that "the pointed dissents...
so soon after Boddie, and Mr. Justice Harlan's failure to join the dissenters,
42. Id. at 383.
43. Id. at 376 (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 383.
45. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
46. Id. at 442 (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382.)
47. Id.
48. Id. at 443.
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surely are not without some significance as to their and the Court's attitude
about the application of the Boddie principle to bankruptcy fees."
4 9
Blackmun then turned to a detailed analysis of what he saw as the
substantive differences between Boddie and Kras. Blackmun asserted that
"the Boddie appellants' inability to dissolve their marriages seriously
impaired their freedom to pursue other protected associational activities. 50
By contrast, he contended that "Kras's alleged interest in the elimination of
his debt burden, and in obtaining his desired new start in life, although
important and so recognized by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act, does
not rise to the same constitutional level"5' and that "if Kras is not
discharged in bankruptcy, his position will not be materially altered in any
constitutional sense. Gaining or not gaining a discharge will effect no
change with respect to basic necessities.52  In addition, the majority
opinion emphasized the possibility that, unlike those seeking to end their
marriages, a debtor might be able to gain significant relief without benefit
of judicial intervention by negotiating with his creditors53 -a point that was
also the focus of Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion.54
Finally, Blackmun noted what he characterized as the insignificance
of the burden that the bankruptcy fees imposed on debtors. Observing that
the weekly cost of the required fees would be "a sum less than the
payments Kras makes on his couch of negligible value in storage, and less
than the price of a movie and little more than the cost of a pack or two of
cigarettes, '55 he declared that "if [Kras] really needs and desires that
discharge, this much available revenue should be within his able-bodied
reach when the adjudication in bankruptcy has stayed collection and has
brought to a halt whatever harassment, if any, he may have sustained from
creditors.
56
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall saw no cognizable
distinction between the constitutional issues presented by Boddie and Kras
and would have required the government to allow indigents to file for
bankruptcy without paying the fee. Stewart asserted that "in the unique
situation of the indigent bankrupt, the Government provides the only
effective means of his ever being free of these Government-imposed
49. Id.
50. Kras, 409 U.S. at 444-45.
51. Id. at 445.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 450-51 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
55. Id. at 449.
56. Id.
[Vol. 43:4
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obligations5 7 and Douglas contended that the "discrimination in [Kras]
denies equal protection within our decisions which make particularly
'invidious' discrimination based on wealth or race."58  However,
Marshall's condemnation of the majority opinion was particularly
impassioned.59 He decried Blackmun's reliance on Harlan's vote to deny
certiorari in the earlier bankruptcy cases, noting that the vote could have
been based on any number of considerations that were independent of
Harlan's views on the merits and observing that:
The point of our use of a discretionary writ is precisely to
prohibit that kind of speculation. When we deny certiorari,
no one, not even ourselves, should think that the denial
indicates a view on the merits of the case. It ill serves
judges of the courts throughout the country to tell them, as
the majority does today, that in attempting to determine
what the law is, they must read, not only the opinions of
this Court, but also the thousands of cases in which we
60annually deny certiorari.
But Marshall was even more irate about Blackmun's suggestion that
the payment of the required fee would not create serious hardships for
those seeking bankruptcy protection. He complained that:
It may be easy for some people to think that weekly
savings of less than $2 are no burden. But no one who has
had close contact with poor people can fail to understand
how close to the margin of survival many of them are. A
sudden illness, for example, may destroy whatever savings
they may have accumulated, and by eliminating a sense of
security may destroy the incentive to save in the future. A
pack or two of cigarettes may be, for them, not a routine
purchase but a luxury indulged in only rarely. The
desperately poor almost never go to see a movie, which the
majority seems to believe is an almost weekly activity.
They have more important things to do with what little
money they have-like attempting to provide some
comforts for a gravely ill child, as Kras must do.
57. Id. at 455 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 458 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 451-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 461 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what
the Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful for an
interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon
unfounded assumptions about how people live.
61
For obvious reasons, progressives were disappointed with the result
and majority opinion in Kras.62 The decision was clearly a major setback
for those who sought to use the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as
vehicles to create significant constitutional protection for poor people as a
class. But many advocates for the poor were even more dismayed by the
Court's disposition of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.
63
In Rodriguez, the justices were called upon to enter a dispute that
some progressives analogized to the struggle to end racial segregation in
American schools.64 The problem arose from the system by which public
schools were financed in the United States. While in most cases the state
governments themselves provided a significant portion of the funding of
the schools through statewide taxes, in almost every state individual school
districts were also charged with the obligation of raising much of their own
funds through the imposition of taxes levied on real property within the
district. As a result, the amount of money available to spend on schools
often varied widely between districts depending not only on the rate at
which property was taxed but also the value of the property upon which
taxes could be imposed.
For many years, this regime went largely unchallenged. However, in
the late 1960s, progressives filed a series of lawsuits based on the theory
that dramatic differences in spending on education inevitably created
differences in educational opportunity between students in rich districts and
students in poor districts, and that the resulting inequality violated
constitutional norms. In 1971, progressives won a signal victory in
61. Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 55, 66 (1973).
63. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Both the dispute that
gave rise to Rodriguez and the Supreme Court's treatment of the case are described in detail in
PAUL A. SRACIC, SAN ANTONIO V. RODRIGUEZ AND THE PURSUIT OF EQUAL EDUCATION (2006).
For other perspectives, see, for example, Michael Heise, The Story of San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez: School Finance, Local Control and Constitutional Limits in
MICHAEL OLIVAS and RONNA SCHNEIDER, eds., EDUCATION LAW STORIES (2007) and Richard
Schragger, San Antonio v. Rodriguez and the Legal Geography of School Finance Reform in
MIRIAM GILLES AND RISA GOLUBOFF, eds., CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES (2008).
64. See Philip B. Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional
Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 583 (1968).
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Serrano v. Priest,65 in which the California Supreme Court embraced their
position and paved the way for dramatic reform in the manner in which the
public schools in the state were financed. The proponents of radical change
in the school financing system were further galvanized when a presidential
commission formed to study the problem issued a report supporting their
position.
66
The casc that ultimately brought the issue to the Supreme Court arose
from a challenge to the manner in which the state of Texas financed its
public schools. While the Texas system was complicated, one point was
clear-the amount of money available to each school district was
determined in large measure by the amount of property taxes that were
raised in the district, leading to a substantial disparity of resources between
property-poor and property-rich districts. The way in which the system
operated was illustrated by a comparison between two different school
districts, both of which were located in the metropolitan area of San
Antonio, Texas.
The Englewood Independent School District, whose population was
composed primarily of minority students, was located in the core city of
San Antonio. The median family income in the district was $4,681 per
year and, because little commercial and industrial property was located
there, the assessed property value per pupil was $5,690. As a result, with a
tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of value, the total amount of money available to
the Englewood district was $356 per pupil. By contrast, families of
students in the predominantly Anglo Alamo Heights Independent School
District had a median income of $8,001 per year, and the average assessed
value of the real property located in the district was $49,000 per pupil.
Thus, with a property tax rate of $0.85 per $100 of assessed value, the
Alamo Heights district could spend $594 per person.67
Those challenging the constitutionality of the Texas system argued
that the heavy emphasis on local property taxes violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The plaintiffs contended that the constitutionality of the
system should be judged by a more stringent standard than the traditional
rational basis test for two separate reasons. First, they asserted that the use
of the system discriminated against poor residents of Texas on the basis of
wealth. Second, they argued that disparities in access to resources
inevitably led to inequality in educational opportunity, and that because
education should be considered a fundamental right, such disparities should
65. Serrano v. Priest, 483 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
66. N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 1972, p. 1.
67. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 12-13.
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be subjected to strict scrutiny. Finally, the challengers claimed that, in any
event, the Texas system failed to pass even the rational basis test.
68
These arguments provoked a variety of responses. First, even if one
accepted the general proposition that wealth should be considered a suspect
classification, it was far from clear that the reliance on local property taxes
to finance public education qualified as wealth discrimination; even prior to
the Court's consideration of Rodriguez, a number of studies had
demonstrated that a change to a statewide funding scheme might well put
poor students in the inner city at a disadvantage because they lived close to
high value commercial and industrial property that was a prolific source of
revenue from property taxes.69 But in any event, the basic idea that wealth
should be considered a suspect classification was rejected in Kras, which,
although argued after Rodriguez, was decided before the school finance
decision was announced.
By contrast, the argument that education should be considered a
fundamental right could claim a more plausible constitutional pedigree.
For example, in Brown v. Board of Education,70 Chief Justice Earl Warren
had relied in part on the observation that "education.. . is the most
important function of state and local governments" to justify his conclusion
that the maintenance of racially segregated schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause.71
Nonetheless, as in Kras, the four Nixon appointees formed the core of
a five-justice majority that rejected the constitutional challenge in
Rodriguez. After describing the elements of the Texas school financing
system, Justice Powell's majority opinion first addressed the contention
that the application of strict scrutiny was appropriate because the system
discriminated against some students on the basis of wealth. Powell rejected
this argument, noting that, unlike the cases in which the Court had relied on
wealth discrimination to raise the level of scrutiny, the Texas system
discriminated only against "a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified
only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less
taxable wealth than other districts, 72 and that this class had none of the
traditional "indicia of suspectness."73  Drawing on the framework
68. Id. at 16-17.
69. Stephen R. Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis
ofSerrano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 504 (1972).
70. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71. Id. at 493.
72. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
73. /d.
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developed in the famous Carolene Products footnote,74 he observed that
"the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.75
The majority opinion then turned to the argument that education
should be considered a fundamental right. Referencing earlier decisions in
which the Court had declined to give special protection to the rights to
receive welfare benefits and have access to adequate housing,76 Powell
emphasized the distinction between the "social importance" of a right and
the question of whether that right was "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution.,77 He found no such guarantee with respect to the
right to a public education, rejecting the contention that that right should be
deemed fundamental because education was necessary to the effective
exercise of the right to vote and to the exercise of the First Amendment
freedom of speech.78
Conversely, Powell argued that the specific nature of the issues
presented in Rodriguez made the use of strict scrutiny particularly
inappropriate in that case. In addition to observing that the Court had
consistently emphasized the need to defer to legislative judgments on
issues of fiscal policy, he noted the complexity of the issues related to
public education and implicitly invoked Benjamin Cardozo's principle of
"experimental federalism,"79 averring that, "the judiciary is well advised to
refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that
could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to
keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions.'80 Thus, while leaving open
the possibility that the Court might take a different view of a case in which
public education was completely denied to some class of children,81 Powell
concluded that the rational basis test provided the appropriate standard of
review in Rodriguez. Applying this test, he had no trouble in finding that
the Texas system was rationally related to the state interest in assuring a
74. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
75. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
76. Id. at 32 (citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare benefits)).
77. Id. at32.
78. Id. at 35-38.
79. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
80. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at43.
81. Id. at 37 (by implication).
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basic education for each child in the state while at the same time providing
for "a large measure of participation in and control of each district's
schools at the local level. 82
Although he joined Justice Powell's majority opinion, Potter Stewart
also filed a separate concurrence, emphasizing his view that, in general, the
Equal Protection Clause should not be seen as a vehicle for enforcing
fundamental rights.83 In addition, three separate dissenting opinions were
written in Rodriguez. Justices Douglas and Brennan joined an opinion by
Justice White, which concluded that the Texas system lacked a rational
basis.84  White conceded that a financing system might well be
constitutional if it provided a meaningful opportunity for parents to
improve their children's education by increasing per pupil expenditures.
85
However, he argued that no such option was realistically available in
property-poor districts such as Englewood.86 Brennan also added a
separate opinion87 contending that education should be considered a
fundamental right because, in his view, "there can be no doubt that
education is inextricably linked to the right to participate in the electoral
process and to the rights of free speech and association."
88
In addition to concurring with White, Douglas joined an opinion by
Thurgood Marshall, which, like Marshall's opinion in Kras, differed
markedly in tone from the other two dissents.89 Marshall emphasized the
fundamentality of education for constitutional purposes90 and criticized the
two-tiered approach to equal protection analysis more generally, arguing
that the Court should instead adopt a "sliding scale" approach under which
the justices would be called upon to make individualized judgments
assessing the significance of the particular right at stake and the importance
of the state interest served by the challenged classification.9' But he also
complained bitterly that Rodriguez was "a retreat from our historic
commitment to equality of educational opportunity and an unsupportable
acquiescence in a system which deprives children in their earliest years of
82. Id. at 49.
83. Id. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 63-70 (White, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 64.
86. Id. at 64-65.
87. Id. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 63.
89. Id. at 70-133 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 98.
91. Id. at 98-103.
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the chance to reach their full potential as citizens"92 and that, because of the
majority's unwillingness to strike down the Texas school financing
scheme, "countless children [will] unjustifiably receive inferior educations
that 'may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone. ',
9 3
Despite the holdings in Kras and Rodriguez, advocates for the poor
continued to press constitutional claims in a variety of different contexts.
94
Cases that focused on the intersection between poverty and abortion rights
elicited particularly strong reactions from the justices. In 1973, the Court
held in Roe v. Wade95 that the right to choose whether or not to bear a child
was fundamental for constitutional purposes, and that therefore limitations
on access to abortion were permissible only when necessary to serve a
compelling governmental interest. Against this background, pro-choice
attorneys argued that the government could not constitutionally deny poor
women funding for abortions while at the same time providing such
funding for the expenses attendant to childbirth when a fetus was carried to
term. With the Nixon appointees once again providing critical votes, the
Court rejected this contention in Maher v. Roe
96 and Harris v. McRae.97
The majority opinions in Maher and Harris, respectively, were crafted
by Lewis Powell and Potter Stewart, both of whom had joined the majority
in Roe. Both Powell and Stewart distinguished sharply between
government policies that created barriers to abortion access and those
policies that facilitated one choice rather than another. Thus, in Maher,
Powell asserted that "an indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no
disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth;
she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the service
she desires', 98 and that "the [fact that] indigency that may make it
difficult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women to
have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the
Connecticut regulation."99 Similarly, in Harris, Stewart contended that
"[a]lthough the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords
protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom of
92. Id. at 71.
93. Id. at 71-72 (citation omitted).
94. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (Medicaid benefits for
institutionalized people with mental illness).
95. Roe v. Wade, 411 U.S. 113 (1973).
96. Maher v. Roe, 434 U.S. 464 (1977).
97. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
98. Maher, 434 U.S. at 474.
99. Id.
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choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an
entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages
of that freedom."'
00
Not surprisingly, the three justices who dissented in Maher and the
four dissenters in Harris saw the situation quite differently. Once again,
Thurgood Marshall was particularly passionate in his criticisms of the
majority. Chastising Powell for what Marshall described "insensitivity to
the human dimension of [the abortion funding] decisions,"10 1 he
complained that:
The enactments challenged here brutally coerce poor
women to bear children whom society will scom for every
day of their lives. Many thousands of unwanted minority
and mixed-race children now spend blighted lives in foster
homes, orphanages, and "reform" schools. . . . I am
appalled at the ethical bankruptcy of those who preach a
"right to life" that means, under present social policies, a
bare existence in utter misery for so many poor women and
their children. 
102
Brennan's dissent in Harris was couched in equally strong language. He
asserted that:
The [statute at issue] is a transparent attempt by the
Legislative Branch to impose the political majority's
judgment of the morally acceptable and socially desirable
preference on a sensitive and intimate decision that the
Constitution entrusts to the individual. Worse yet, the
Hyde Amendment does not foist that majoritarian
viewpoint with equal measure upon everyone in our
Nation, rich and poor alike; rather, it imposes that
viewpoint only upon that segment of our society which,
because of its position of political powerlessness, is least
able to defend its privacy rights from the encroachments of
state-mandated morality."°3
100. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317-18.
101. Beal v. Doe, 438 U.S. 438, 457 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 456-57 (citations omitted).
103. Harris, 448 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Taken together, the decisions in Kras, Rodriguez, Maher and Harris
established the proposition that, in general, the Court should not intervene
to provide special protection for the interests of the poor as a class, but
should instead leave such interests in the hands of other branches of
government-a principle that remains firmly ensconced in constitutional
doctrine even today.'0 4  At the same time, if Hubert Humphrey had
defeated Nixon in the 1968 election, all of these cases would no doubt have
been decided differently. Each case found the Court deeply divided, with
the Nixon appointees forming the core of the majority which rejected the
constitutional arguments made by progressives on behalf of the poor. By
contrast, one can confidently predict that Humphrey would have chosen
nominees who shared his own progressive instincts, and would thus have
been be inclined to join progressive holdovers William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall to create majorities that were far more receptive to the
claims of the poor.
Nor would the impact of a Humphrey victory have been limited to the
expansion of constitutional protections for the poor. The votes of the
Nixon appointees were crucial in a wide variety of cases in which the Court
accepted the legal arguments made by conservatives, including decisions
which vindicated the constitutionality of antisodomy laws,0 5 allowed states
to impose significant restrictions on access to abortions,'0 6 limited the
scope of remedies in school desegregation cases,10 7 declined to impose
strict scrutiny on gender-based classifications,0 8 rejected the claims of
criminal defendants,09 deferred to state regulation of sexually explicit
literature"0  and subjected affirmative action plans to stringent
constitutional limitations.''' In each of these contexts, Humphrey
appointees would undoubtedly been more sympathetic to progressive
arguments. In short, a Humphrey victory in 1968 would almost certainly
have led to the creation of a constitutional order, which by modem
standards would have been almost unrecognizable.
104. See, e.g., Andy Siegel, From Bad to Worse: Some Early Speculation About the Roberts
Court and the Constitutional Fate of the Poor 59 S.C. L. REV. 851 (2008) (summarizing
caselaw).
105. Bowers v. Hardwick, 476 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
538 (2003).
106. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
107. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
108. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (search and seizure); Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to counsel).
110. Millerv. California, 413 U.S. 15(1973).
111. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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Conclusion
The developments of the Burger era provide a clear illustration of the
impact that a single presidential election can have on the ideological
orientation of constitutional doctrine. The effect of the outcome of the
2016 election may well be no less significant in this regard. To be sure,
unlike Richard Nixon, the candidate who is chosen in the upcoming
election is unlikely to have the opportunity to select as many as four
justices during her first term in office. But, given the current makeup of
the Court, even a single appointment might well have a profound effect on
the evolution of constitutional law for the foreseeable future.
From this perspective, the debate between those who argue that the
decisions of the Supreme Court are based simply on ordinary political
concerns and those who insist that the justices are moved largely by
distinctively legal considerations is of relatively little practical
significance." 12 Even assuming that all of the justices are making a good
faith effort to apply "neutral" legal principles,"3 in each case the content of
those principles will depend upon the particular legal theory to which the
justice subscribes. Conversely, during the selection process, each president
will choose nominees who adhere to theories that generate results that are
generally consistent with the political perspective of that president. Thus,
in essence, the choice of Supreme Court justices becomes a mechanism by
which each president can ensure that his own political views will continue
to influence policy decisions long after the president himself has left office.
Against this background, if recent history is to be taken as a guide,
progressives in particular can be confident that they will be satisfied with
the choices made by a Democratic president. Each of the seven
appointments made by Democratic presidents since 1962 has
enthusiastically embraced the fundamental tenets of progressive
constitutionalism, and there is no reason to believe that the behavior of the
nominees of a future Democratic president will be any different. Thus,
assuming that a Democrat has the opportunity to replace Justice Scalia, one
can predict with some certainty that the overall orientation of constitutional
jurisprudence will move sharply to the left.
112. For a nuanced discussion of the interaction between ordinary politics and distinctively
legal principles in the judicial decision-making process, see MARK V. TUSHNET, IN THE
BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ROBERTS COURT (2013).
113. The concept of neutral principles is elaborated in Herbert Wechsler, Toward Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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By contrast, over the past half-century, the performance of the justices
chosen by Republican presidents has proven to be less predictable.
114
However, frustrated by the performance of some recent Republican
appointments, the conservatives who dominate the party have become
increasingly vocal in demanding that future nominees have demonstrated
that they were indeed committed to the tenets of conservative constitutional
theory.15 Thus, one can only assume that any Republican president chosen
in 2016 will make every effort to identify candidates with such a
commitment, with the ultimate goal of creating a Court dominated by
justices who share those Values.116
In any event, whichever party ultimately prevails in the next election,
a recognition of the relationship between the appointments process and the
evolution of constitutional doctrine should play a more significant role in
academic discussions of constitutional theory generally. Constitutional
scholars have been preoccupied with the project of defining the role that
judicial review ought to play in the American political system and creating
models that they insist will generate decisions that are consistent with that
role.117 Whatever merits these projects might have in purely intellectual
terms, they are unlikely to produce a major impact on the development of
constitutional doctrine in the real world. Instead, in the post-1968 era, the
114. For example, during the 2003 term of the Supreme Court both John Paul Stevens, who
had been appointed by Republican Gerald Ford and Justice David Souter, who had been
appointed by Republican George H. W. Bush, were far more likely to be aligned with
progressives Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer than with any of the conservative
members of the Court. Note, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-The Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV.
497, 499 (2004).
115. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Conservative Pundits Packed a Real Punch, WASH. POST
(Oct. 28, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/27/AR20051
02702240.html (discussing conservative opposition to nomination of Harriet Miers).
116. In at least one important respect, the behavior of such a majority is likely to be
somewhat different than it would have been during the Burger era. At the time that Richard
Nixon was making his choices for the Court, conservative constitutional theorists such as Robert
Bork were emphasizing the need to defer to the decisions of other branches of government.
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
In more recent years, by contrast, conservative commentators such as Randy Barnett and Richard
Epstein have argued that he Court should intervene more actively in cases involving issues such
as property rights and challenges to the scope of federal authority more generally. RANDY E.
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004);
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION (2014). Thus, a twenty-first
century Court dominated by justices who are committed to conservative ideology is likely not
only to reject efforts to deploy the Constitution in support of progressive values, but also to
invalidate a variety of progressive actions taken by other branches of government.
117. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1981); JOHN 0. MCGINNIS AND MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE
GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013); LAURENCE H. TRIBE AND MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE
CONSTITUTION (1991).
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Court's decisions on divisive constitutional issues have clearly become
little more than the ghosts of presidencies past, subject only to random
contingencies, which are by their nature unpredictable at the time that
appointments are made. However uncomfortable this reality might be, we
ignore it only at our peril.
